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Chapter 6 
 
British Muslims and the anti-war movement 
 
Timothy Peace 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
On 15th February 2003 demonstrations were held around the world to oppose the invasion of 
Iraq, a global event considered to be the ‘largest protest event in human history’ (Walgrave 
and Rucht 2010). The demonstration held in London attracted an estimated 2 million people 
which dwarfed the previous mass rallies of British political history including the Chartists, 
the Suffragettes, and anti-Vietnam war protestors (Gillan et al 2008). This anti-war 
movement ‘generated not just the biggest demonstrations in British history but also an 
unprecendented outbreak of direct action, including the biggest wave of school walkouts’ 
(Nineham 2013). Ten years on, it was claimed that this mass protest ‘defined a generation’, as 
for many it was the first time they had taken to the streets (Barkham 2013). Images from that 
day show a sea of people with various placards that were handed out. Alongside those 
prepared by the Daily Mirror newspaper and the Stop the War Coalition (StWC), the main 
organiser of the event, some of the most ubiquitous were those belonging to the Muslim 
Association of Britain (MAB). This is just one indication of the role that British Muslims 
played in both the organisation and participation of the anti-war march that day. Indeed, 
while it is impossible to garner exact figures, it is certain that this was also the largest 
mobilisation of British Muslims. Many of them had travelled from all over the country, often 
on specially organised coaches, in order to make their voice heard in the capital. Others 
participated in demonstrations in towns and cities up and down the country. Yet the 
involvement of British Muslims in the anti-war movement goes beyond their participation in 
that worldwide day of action. They were involved in the movement from the very founding of 
the StWC, at a time when the war in question was the invasion of Afghanistan. They also 
continued to be a part of the movement long after the invasion and occupation of Iraq had 
begun. 
In this chapter I will trace the history of that involvement and in particular some of the 
key figures and activists who were involved. Data comes from interviews conducted in 2008 
with these actors as well as secondary sources on the development of the anti-war movement. 
I will argue that the involvement of Muslims in the British anti-war movement acted as a 
springboard to the development of what we might call ‘Muslim civil society’ and also created 
opportunities for a new generation of Muslim leaders to emerge from the shadows of the first 
generation. Since 2003 we have witnessed increased politicisation and awareness regarding 
political participation amongst British Muslims. The chapter also highlights the varied modes 
of engagement with the anti-war movement, including progressive forms of political 
involvement and that of more conservative groups. Indeed, the movement provided a point of 
unity around which all Muslims could rally, irrespective of their ideological or sectarian 
differences. For Muslims to be embraced by the wider movement, barriers of mistrust and 
hesitancy had to be overcome. These tensions will be outlined and discussed as well as the 
reasons why certain Muslim figures were pushed to the forefront in order to display a ‘united 
front’ of Britons of diverse origins and backgrounds. Firstly however, it is necessary to put 
this activism in the context of earlier mobilisations of Muslims in Britain. 
 
 
The Rushdie protests and the beginnings of British Muslim activism 
 
 
The campaign to ban Salman Rushdie’s book The Satanic Verses was the first example of a 
social movement that managed to mobilise British Muslims en masse. This is not to say that 
it was the first time Muslims had been involved in political protest. They had been involved 
in various forms of contentious politics such as industrial disputes or demonstrating against 
racism in society. However there was nothing ‘Muslim specific’ in these actions and the 
mobilising identity was more likely to be their status as either immigrants or ethnic minorities 
and the discrimination they faced as a result. Religious identities were simply not salient at 
the time. The Asian Youth Movements of the 1970s were keen to stress unity across the 
various South Asian religious groups but were essentially secular in character (Ramamurthy 
2013). It was not until the 1980s that the first explicitly Muslim demands were made in the 
public sphere, this most commonly related to provisions based on religious needs such as 
providing halal food or prayer facilities. The formation of the Bradford Council for Mosques 
at the beginning of the decade had some early success in persuading the local government to 
enact policies that would reflect the specific needs of what we would now term the ‘Muslim 
community’. Such concessions were not obtained merely through discussion or lobbying of 
local politicians. As documented by Phil Lewis (1994) in his groundbreaking book on the 
city, direct action was also employed in Bradford such as the 1983 boycott of schools and a 
demonstration outside the town hall to demand the provision of halal meat. Similar action 
was also taken in the wake of the ‘Honeyford affair’ when a local head teacher sparked 
controversy after he published an article in a right-wing journal in which he complained 
about the problems caused by large numbers of Asian children in his school and the influence 
of the ‘race relations lobby’. Such mobilisations, which were not limited to Bradford, 
remained at a local level. The Rushdie affair changed all that.  
 The publication of The Satanic Verses in 1988 politicised a generation of Muslims in 
Britain. It contributed to the formation of a specific Muslim political identity (Meer 2010) 
and also provided the foundation for future mobilisation ‘as Muslims’ rather than a racialised 
minority such as Blacks, Asians, Pakistanis etc. Bradford was again the focus of attention 
when a copy of Rushdie’s novel was publicly burned in a square in front of the town hall on 
14th January 1989 (Samad 1992). However, the mobilisation by British Muslims was 
national in character and managed to unite the various religious trends and political divisions 
that had hitherto been present amongst them. The United Kingdom Action Committee on 
Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) was set up in October 1988 as a national body to co-ordinate 
dissent and call for the book to be banned in Britain just as it had been in other countries such 
as India. A secondary aspect of this protest was the call for Rushdie to be put on trial for the 
offence of blasphemy. Indeed, the UKACIA even went to the House of Lords with their case 
but a previous ruling was upheld which stated that the English legal system only recognised 
blasphemy against Christianity, and in particular the Church of England (Weller 2009).  
 The high point of the co-ordinated protest by Muslims in Britain was the 
demonstration on 27th May 1989 in London, gathering an estimated 70, 000 protestors. 
Hundreds of coaches took groups of Muslims down to the capital for the demonstration. The 
event could be described as a PR disaster. Demonstrators were photographed burning the 
British flag and effigies of Rushdie, some even carried portraits of the Iranian leader 
Khomeini. The methods of political protest seemed to be directly imported from the Indian 
sub-continent and demonstrated the importance of first generation migrants in their 
organisation. The protest turned violent and battles broke out between Muslim youths and the 
police as the march reached Westminster. The images from that day as well as those from the 
book burnings did irreparable damage to the perception of British Muslims in the eyes of the 
wider public. Unsurprisingly, none of their demands were ever met and their claims failed to 
resonate with the wider public who perceived this to be an attack on the freedom of 
expression from an illiberal minority. This prompted Kalim Siddiqui, founder and director of 
the Muslim Institute in London, to publish a ‘Muslim Manifesto’ in 1990 which proposed a 
Council of British Muslims. Two years later he created the Muslim Parliament, arguing that 
Muslims needed to form a separate political system. These initiatives remained marginal and 
beyond the mainstream of British Muslim opinion. In fact, it was not until March 1994 that 
then Home Secretary Michael Howard called on Muslim leaders (mostly those involved with 
the UKACIA) to establish a representative body. This eventually led to the creation of the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997 however the Rushdie protests actually retarded 
such a process because of the negative interpretation of events that was shared across the 
political spectrum. It did however prove that Muslims could be mobilised across the UK and 
also encouraged the formation of new national organisations such as the Islamic Society of 
Britain (ISB) that was set up in 1990. 
  
British Muslim activism in the 1990s 
 
 
The 1990-1991 Gulf War was the next event to mobilise the Muslim community in Britain 
although on a much smaller scale and without the vehemence and fervour that characterised 
the anti-Rushdie protests. Many Muslims opposed the intervention by Allied forces against 
Iraq, but more specifically, opposed the stationing of Western troops on Saudi Arabian soil 
close to Islam’s most holiest sites. They also directed their anger at Saudi Arabia for allowing 
this to happen and some were bitter about what they perceived to be a lack of leadership the 
Saudis had shown during the Rushdie affair by not putting more pressure on the British 
government (Lewis 1994, Werbner 1994). Unlike the Rushdie affair, there was not a wide 
consensus amongst British Muslims regarding the war that was waged against Iraq in 
response to the invasion and annexation of Kuwait. However, what this event did have in 
common with the Rushdie protest is the general bemusement and misunderstanding from 
mainstream society with respect to those Muslims who opposed military intervention. Pnina 
Werbner, the anthropologist of Pakistanis in Britain, describes her reaction to the beliefs of a 
group in Manchester to the Gulf crisis: 
 
What struck me most forcefully, however, even in these early conversations with 
moderate non activists, was that once again, as in the Rushdie affair, British 
Pakistanis seemed to be setting themselves morally apart from British society, 
denying categorically what their fellow British nationals regarded as axiomatic moral 
imperatives: ‘our boys’ were in the Gulf, risking their lives, threatened by chemical 
warfare, poised to fight the fourth largest army in the world, to defend democratic 
values against a man who, at the very least, was a ruthless dictator who had invaded 
and taken over another country (Werbner 1994: 213) 
 
 
Muslim demands for the withdrawal of troops fell on deaf ears and this perceived lack of 
patriotism also led to attacks on Mosques and other forms of violence. For a number of 
second generation British Muslims, the Gulf War was their first experience of political 
activism. Anas al-Tikriti, whose family had fled Iraq in the early 1970s, was one such 
activist. He claims that people were wary about protesting against Operation Desert Storm 
because the reputation of the Muslim community had been badly damaged after the Rushdie 
affair. It was ‘a badly managed campaign where Muslims came out looking worse than they 
did before.’1 For this reason, it became more of a letter writing protest. The mainstream anti-
war movement at the time was overwhelmingly made up of leftist activists who made no 
attempt to reach out to ethnic minorities. ‘Black people against the war in the gulf’ was set up 
by a small number of activists who felt the anti-war movement didn’t reflect their concerns.2 
 Another significant episode that mobilised Muslims prior to 9/11 was the plight of the 
Bosnian Muslims during the war in the ex-Yugoslavia and in particular the British 
government’s reluctance to intervene in the conflict. British Muslims who were aware of the 
atrocities suffered by their co-religionists in Bosnia became extremely concerned that not 
enough was being done by the international community to help and that it was even 
preventing the Bosnians from arming themselves. This galvanised the Muslim community to 
mobilise and attempts were made to lobby the UK government. The Muslim Parliament 
organized a demonstration outside the European Foreign Ministers Conference in London in 
July 1995 to demand an end to the arms embargo (Radcliffe 2004). Others travelled to the 
former Yugoslavia itself to work as aid volunteers. The ‘Convoy of mercy’ organised by 
British Muslims sent over 80 land convoys to the Balkans which transported medicines, 
medical equipment, clothes, books and aid workers. Much has been written on the 
radicalising effects of the Bosnian conflict on young Muslims in Britain, and some of those 
who travelled to Bosnia for ostensibly humanitarian reasons did end up fighting as 
Mujahideen (Wiktorowicz 2005, Husain 2007, Bhatt 2010). Indeed, there are interesting 
parallels with the Bosnian conflict and that which has engulfed Syria 20 years later. 
Nevertheless, most British Muslim activism regarding Bosnia remained non-violent and 
focused on providing aid.  
 
September 11th and the formation Just Peace 
 
 
It is difficult to underestimate the effect that the events of 11th September 2001 had on the 
British Muslim community. Amongst the older generation, the immediate reaction of many 
was to ‘lay low and hope that it would all blow over’.3 Whereas others decided to mobilise in 
order to ‘defend what they saw as the civilised nature of their faith, to take a stand against 
their own extremists and to prevent the logic of revenge dictating an approach that would 
claim innocent Muslim lives with no connection to the original crime’ (Birt 2005: 92). It is in 
this context that we can understand why many British Muslims later chose to join the anti-
war movement. However, this involvement had rather humble beginnings. The Stop the War 
Coalition (StWC) was set up at a rally on 21st September 2001, just over 2 weeks before the 
start of ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001.4 At the second 
meeting of the Coalition, attempts were made to organise various interest groups such as 
‘nurses against the war’ or ‘lawyers against the war.’ This meeting was attended by Shahed 
Saleem who suggested creating a group that would mobilise Muslims against the war. They 
coalesced into a group of about 10 people including South African born activist Shahedah 
Vawda. It was Shahed and Shahedah who would take a leading role in this group of Muslims 
against the war and the two would later marry.5 The group was named Just Peace and aimed 
to ‘promote Muslim participation in movements that campaign for freedom from oppression 
and injustice.’ It recruited many of its members from the City Circle, a network set up in 
1999 for young Muslim professionals in London (Lewis 2007).  The group regularly met up 
in order to mobilise the Muslim community for the anti-war movement and they were also 
joined by secular groups such as the Palestinian Solidarity Campaign (Birt 2005). Shahed and 
Shahedah were also elected as members of the steering committee of the StWC. 
 Although set up as a group to encourage Muslim participation in the anti-war 
movement, its founders were keen for Just Peace to go beyond what they saw as a narrow 
interpretation of events held by the Muslim mainstream: that this was a war on Islam and that 
was the only justification for opposing the invasion of Afghanistan. Shahed felt it particularly 
compelling that there were so many people involved in StWC, not because of any affiliation 
to cultural or religious concerns, but merely because they thought it was wrong. He thought it 
would be good for Muslims to ‘widen the scope of their campaign as it’s not just about being 
Muslim, it’s about principles. Opposition to the war should not be based simply on religion, 
race or ethnicity.’6 In fact, Just Peace was a radical departure from traditional Muslim groups 
and organisations that ‘tended to centre on the “Muslim condition” and were overtly, to a 
greater or lesser degree, religious. Just Peace was different in this regard – although its 
members practised their religion, it was not a “religious organisation” as such’.7 It initially 
involved both Muslims and non-Muslims and made attempts to be as inclusive as possible. 
The group also did not label itself as a religious organisation and there was no religious 
agenda or ideology that underpinned what they were doing. Although they found that religion 
did need to be invoked when they were trying to persuade people to get active in the anti-war 
movement. A key theme that they utilised was the idea of justice: 
 
The announcement we made at the City Circle was from the angle of ‘your religion 
tells you to stand up for justice.’ So although we were motivated more from a Human 
Rights perspective, we knew that the principle of justice was important for believers, 
as indeed it is for any religion. So we used that to appeal to people and get them 
active.8 
 
They asked religious leaders for help in order to provide some quotes and straplines for their 
leaflets. Providing religious justification was particularly important in the face of some 
opposition to their actions by Muslims who thought they should not be associating with non-
Muslims. They also encouraged well known personalities from the Muslim community to 
speak at their events such as Ghayasuddin Siddiqui who by this time was leading the Muslim 
Parliament and was also involved with the StWC. 
Just Peace retained a core group of about 10 people although some of their meetings 
did attract larger numbers. As the group remained small, they were able to decide on their 
actions via consensus at their weekly meetings. They organised public events and talks and 
encouraged Muslims to join the demonstrations that were being organised by the StWC. This 
would involve handing out leaflets outside mosques and generally putting the word out 
amongst the Muslim community through email newsletters which were subsequently 
forwarded on by various individuals. In this way they were able to influence Muslims beyond 
their own immediate social circle of London. They were, for example, pleasantly surprised to 
receive questions from Muslim groups in places as far afield as Wales.9 The first major 
success of the group was the organisation of a collective breaking of the fast during a 
demonstration that took place during Ramadan on 18th November 2001. The protestors who 
were gathered in London’s Trafalgar Square joined in with a collective iftar and members of 
Just Peace had organised the provision of dates and other food for this purpose as well as the 
call for prayer to be announced via loudspeakers. Muslim activists involved were moved by 
this gesture. It was seen as symbolising an important sign of unity and tolerance and 
encouraged others to join the anti-war movement. In fact, it must be pointed out that since the 
beginnings of the StWC, two keys slogans had been adopted which aimed to show support 
with the Muslim community – “Defend civil liberties” (against anti-terrorism legislation) and 
“Resist the racist backlash” (against the targeting of Muslims for reprisals). 
As international political events developed, the StWC slowly started to shift its 
attention from the conflict in Afghanistan to the potential invasion of Iraq. Shahed Saleem 
recalls attending a meeting of the coalition in 2002 and seeing a banner saying ‘Don’t attack 
Iraq.’ At the time he thought this ‘seemed a bit far fetched’ but weeks later it would become 
apparent that the administration of George W. Bush was seriously contemplating an invasion 
of Iraq. This factor also helped to mobilise more people to the cause, including many 
Muslims, who had by now become very visible at various anti-war protests. The members of 
Just Peace were keen for Muslims to get involved but not to separate themselves from the 
wider movement. As Shahedah Vawda explains: 
 
When we were preparing for a demonstration, one guy, who was actually a friend of 
mine, said ‘all the Muslims should march together’. I said to him, ‘I’m sorry but that’s 
just defeating the whole purpose! The point is that we stand together in solidarity. It’s 
about human rights and our common values. It’s not about Muslims or Muslims in the 
West. That’s what we’re trying to move away from’.10 
 
She felt that if they had gone out and marched ‘as Muslims’ this would have reinforced the 
stereotype of them not being a part of wider society. Through Just Peace they wanted to start 
a debate within their community about Muslims getting involved in the mainstream, about the 
problems of remaining insular, and how they could combat ideas of them not being 
considered as full citizens. These were debates that were already prevalent, particularly 
among Muslims who had been raised in Britain, but the issue of the Iraq war really brought 
them to the fore. However, the idea of Muslims as being ‘different’ was also promoted by 
leaders within the StWC. Shahedah felt like she was treated as some kind of celebrity during 
anti-war demonstrations as an articulate Muslim woman who also wore a headscarf. The 
middle class white women in the movement were ‘quite taken with her’ and some even 
expressed astonishment that she could ‘speak English so well.’11 She was also aware that as a 
Muslim women who covers her hair she was effectively being used by the coalition to send 
out a particular message, but she didn’t mind. ‘They wanted to get Muslim authenticity on 
board and the easiest way to achieve that was to put a Muslim woman with a headscarf on a 
stage.’12 
 
The involvement of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) 
 
 
For many, the involvement of Muslims in the anti-war movement is synonymous with the 
participation of the Muslim Association of Britain. This is puzzling when we consider that 
the organisation at that time was still quite new (founded in 1997) and yet to really establish 
itself on a national scale with a membership of no more than 400 (Phillips 2008). More 
importantly, it was highly unrepresentative of the Muslim community in Britain which is 
largely South Asian in origin. MAB was set up by highly educated Arab individuals, many of 
whom had come to the UK to study in the 1970s and 1980s and ended up settling. As they 
felt largely unrepresented by existing Muslim groups, they decided to set up MAB whose 
ideology is loosely based on the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood (Bowen 2012). It is an 
affiliate of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) which would have been the obvious 
candidate for rallying Muslims to the anti-war cause as the most visible and representative 
national umbrella organisation. However, its role as primary interlocutor with the Labour 
government at the time put it in an awkward situation and immense pressure was applied to 
make the MCB toe the official line on the bombing of Afghanistan. Despite officially 
opposing the war, the MCB ‘withdrew its support for the first anti-war march to placate the 
government, even though a number of its affiliates were involved, but, fearful of being 
outflanked, it publicly endorsed subsequent demonstrations’ (Birt 2005: 96). The damage had 
already been done and organisations such as the MAB were well placed to exploit what was 
seen as a massive political misjudgement by the MCB by the majority of British Muslims. 
When the StWC was first formed, the MAB were invited to join as a member of the coalition 
but they declined. Yet they did take part on an individual basis in their demonstrations 
including the one mentioned above in November 2001 during Ramadan.  
Throughout 2002 the anti-war movement grew as it became increasingly apparent that 
an invasion of Iraq was likely. The leadership of the StWC began to look for an organisation 
that could mobilise even larger numbers of Muslims on a nationwide scale for their protest 
marches. The MAB had organised a successful demonstration in April 2002 against the 
Israeli military operation in the Jenin refugee camp. Anas al-Tikriti, who was at the time their 
director of media and public relations, admits that the response to their call for a 
demonstration was overwhelming. When asked by the Metropolitan Police how many people 
they expected, he said 5000. The actual number turned out to be more than 20 times that 
amount.13 The event attracted media interest and also that of the steering committee of the 
StWC who asked the MAB if they would become a partner and help to organise subsequent 
anti-war marches. Before responding to this invitation, the leaders of the MAB organised a 
meeting with those of Just Peace to ask for their opinion and information on those involved 
with the coalition. The response was positive and the MAB’s young leadership was 
convinced that it was the right thing to do. This moment represented a passing of the baton as 
the MAB became the main organisation charged with mobilising Muslims. Just Peace 
activists were more than happy to allow this to happen as they had limited resources and felt 
that they had done as much as they could.14 They considered that their initial objective to get 
Muslims to join the movement had been achieved and they continued to work with the StWC 
until the invasion of Iraq took place in March 2003. 
The first joint demonstration organised by the StWC and the MAB took place on 28th 
September 2002 just before the start of the Labour Party Conference. There was some 
conflict around the framing of this action with the MAB insisting that Palestine needed to be 
the focus while the StWC preferred slogans to be solely against an attack on Iraq: 
 
The demonstration’s slogan conveyed this pragmatic compromise, ‘No war in Iraq, 
justice for Palestine.’ Unable to agree completely on priorities, MAB decided that its 
leaflets would have ‘Freedome for Palestine’ above ‘Stop the war in Iraq’, while 
StWC’s leaflets put the slogans in the opposite order. MAB had also wanted to call 
the joint demonstration the ‘One million march’ but accepted the StWC’s objection to 
this, that a turnout of less than a million would have been humiliating (Phillips 2008: 
104). 
 
In the end, the estimated turn out was half a million people making it by far the largest 
demonstration to date. It ended with a rally in London’s Hyde Park with speeches from 
leading figures in the movement including the late Tony Benn. The scale of this protest gave 
the StWC huge momentum and encouraged other organisations to get involved such as the 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND). Just over one month later, the European Social 
Forum (ESF) was held in Florence and a call was made to the citizens of Europe to ‘start 
organising enormous anti-war demonstrations in every capital on February 15th’ followed by 
a large protest held in the Tuscan city on 9th November 2002 (Verhulst 2010). Preparations 
were then started for the worldwide demonstration of 15th February 2003, of which the StWC 
in the UK played a leading role. The demonstration that took place in London was officially 
co-organised by the StWC, the CND and the MAB which now had a platform that was 
beyond its leaders wildest dreams. The fact that MAB spokesmen like Anas al-Tikriti and 
Azzam Tamimi were invited to address the sea of people in Hyde Park that day demonstrates 
the important role that they played in the organisation of this record breaking demonstration. 
The initial role of Just Peace was not forgotten as Shahedah Vawda was also given an 
opportunity to stand ‘on the windswept stage to address a crowd so large she could not even 
see where it ended’ (Brown 2003). She also took part in a televised debate with Tony Blair on 
10th March along with other women who were opposed to the war.15 
 
The difficulties of collective action 
 
 
In the ‘official’ accounts of the anti-war movement produced by its leaders (Murray and 
German 2005, Nineham 2013), the participation of Muslims is recounted as unproblematic 
and almost natural. However, this glosses over a certain reticence that was apparent both 
within certain sections of the anti-war movement and internally amongst British Muslims 
themselves. When Just Peace began their efforts to bring Muslims into the anti-war 
movement they faced some resistance. Some felt it was wrong to be associating too closely 
with non-Muslims and by doing so ‘you were taking up their cause rather than ours, which 
some saw as haram.’16 This was a line that was being propagated by activists involved with 
groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir but there was also suspicion among those with less radical 
sympathies. For example, the MAB leadership had to work hard to persuade its members that 
‘collaboration with non-Muslim anti-war activists was halal (religiously permissible)’ 
(Phillips 2008: 103). Part of the problem was that the StWC was known to be led by 
personalities associated with the radical left, in particular the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). 
This was part of the reason that the MAB refused to join the actual coalition, as it was known 
to be ‘led by the Left’ (Phillips 2008: 104) which was problematic for some. According to 
those in MAB, the Muslim community needed to identify with something that it could trust: 
‘I couldn’t bring out 200,000 Muslims to rally under the banner of trade unions, leftist, 
socialist or communist organisations.’17  
This kind of mistrust was also present within some of the leftist groups that were part 
of StWC. There were anti-clerical factions which see religious organisations, particularly 
those with a more conservative bent such as the MAB, as reactionary and contrary to the 
aspirations of the working class. An example of such a group is the Alliance for Workers 
Liberty (AWL) which openly opposed the alliance with the MAB given that it was ‘a right-
wing organisation.’18 Such opposition was quickly silenced by the leadership of the StWC, 
and its press officer Mike Marqusee claimed that ‘those people who questioned the link with 
MAB were castigated as Islamophobes’ (Gillan et al 2008: 75). Such tactics are hardly 
surprising when we consider that some of the key figures in the StWC were also on the 
SWP's Central Committee, including the likes of Lindsey German, Chris Nineham and John 
Rees.19 As a group that practices ‘democratic centralism’, a system of decision making in the 
revolutionary Marxist tradition, they were often criticised for promoting a veneer of equal 
participation, whilst effectively taking many key decisions behind closed doors. Shahed 
Saleem recounts that as an officer of the StWC he would attend their meetings where ‘it 
seemed like the conversations that took place were a continuation of previous discussions 
they [SWP members] had been having. By having me there they could claim that they were 
being democratic but I didn’t have that much input.’20 
 The involvement of MAB was initially opposed by some members of the CND and 
they were also ‘seen as too conservative by other Muslim groups’ (Gillan et al 2008: 67). 
Some regretted the fact that in order to work with the Muslim community, the StWC had 
‘decided to work with Islamists’ and that they did not make any efforts to ‘engage with the 
many secular groups that exist within the Muslim community’ (Phillips 2008: 107). 
Similarly, journalistic accounts of the inherent ideological contradictions within the anti-war 
movement focus on the role of MAB and its links to the Muslim Brotherhood (Cohen 2007). 
These critiques do however overlook the fact that the coalition’s main goal was to rally as 
many as people as possible to its demonstrations rather than construct a coherent political 
project. They also conflate the participation of thousands of British Muslims in the 
demonstrations, most of whom would have no particular organisational affiliation, and the 
organisation which was tasked with mobilising them. The MAB leadership noted that most of 
those who volunteered to help them to organise the protests were not members of their 
organisation.21 Its membership doubled as a result of its involvement in the anti-war 
movement but by the end of 2005 those who led this initiative lost control of the organisation 
and were later forced to set up a new group called the British Muslim Initiative (Phillips 
2008).  
 
Conclusion 
 
 
The activists who were interviewed for this research were unanimous that participation in the 
anti-war movement led to a new found confidence within the Muslim community, 
particularly amongst those who were born and raised in Britain. ‘What is noticeable about the 
post-September 11 response was the willingness of younger Muslims to form expedient 
alliances of dissent outside of their community, which was certainly not true of the Rushdie 
affair in 1989 or the Gulf War of 1991’ (Birt 2005: 102). The idea of working and 
campaigning alongside people from other walks of life is no longer alien and Shahed Saleem 
was proud to play a part in ‘leading Muslims out of the cold and away from blinkered 
thinking.’22 The mistakes of the Rushdie affair were avoided as the second generation 
‘learned modes of protest’ (Heath et al 2013: 191) and adapted their methods of dissent to be 
more in tune with British political culture. It has been remarked that ‘a new generation of 
skilled and media-savvy Muslims activists has emerged who regularly engage with 
journalists, policy makers, academics and activists from other faiths, in a self-conscious 
attempt to redress perceived biases in media coverage’ (Bolognani and Statham 2013: 246). 
The generational shift that the anti-war movement promoted could only have positive effects 
for the perception of Muslims by the wider British public. Indeed, the overwhelmingly calm 
and sensible reaction to the London bombings of 2005, just two years after the huge anti-war 
march, impressed many and seemed to demonstrate the tolerance of wider society. This was 
also interpreted as a result of Muslims becoming more visible in the public sphere and 
increased interaction between them and other citizens. Shahedah Vawda thought that it was 
‘amazing how ordinary British people have tried to learn more about Islam and make an 
effort to show that they are not against all Muslims.’23  
Despite the efforts to halt the war eventually being in vain, this mobilisation did 
propel a number of individuals to the forefront of what one might now term ‘Muslim civil 
society’. A prominent example is Salma Yaqoob who founded ‘Respect: The Unity 
Coalition’ in early 2004. This political party would go on to play a leading role in getting 
Muslims involved in electoral politics and achieved some notable election victories (Peace 
2013). Yaqoob served as a Respect local councillor in Birmingham from 2006-2011 and 
narrowly missed out on becoming a Westminster MP in 2005 and 2010. Although she has 
now left the party, she is still a prominent figure in British public debates. Anas Al-tikriti, the 
driving force behind the involvement of the MAB in the StWC, was also briefly involved in 
Respect. He stood as one of their candidates in the 2004 European elections but then left to 
found the British Muslim Initiative and then the Cordoba Foundation. The path of Dr 
Ghayasuddin Siddiqui is symbolic of the changes in Muslim Civil Society since the Rushdie 
affair. In 1989 he was part of the British Muslim delegation in Iran that had asked 
Mohammad Khatami to act on Rushdie, which led to the notorious fatwa pronounced by 
Ayatollah Khomeini. He is now a trustee of British Muslims for Secular Democracy (BMSD) 
and campaigns against forced marriage, domestic violence and murder in the name of honour. 
The Muslim Institute, which he helped to form back in 1973, and at one time acted as a front 
for the Iranian Embassy in London, was re-founded in 2010 and now has a more progressive 
outlook publishing the quarterly magazine Critical Muslim. His son Asim Siddiqui was one 
of the founders of the City Circle which continues to provide Muslim professionals with ‘a 
safe space for communities to self-critically discuss and debate issues that have concerned 
them.’24 Just as the Rushdie affair led to the creation of a series of new Muslim organisations, 
the anti-war movement has provided the basis for the development of groups with more of a 
focus on wider society. For example, ENGAGE works towards enhancing the active 
engagement of British Muslim communities in national life, particularly in the fields of 
politics and the media and MADE in Europe is a movement of young people who want to see 
the Muslim community lead the fight against global poverty and injustice.25 This trend of 
new Muslim Civil Society groups is likely to continue and they owe a debt of gratitude to 
those activists who became involved in the anti-war movement who demonstrated that 
Muslim activism could be about more than strictly religious issues.  
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